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Considerable  progress  has been  made  in reforming  the Hungar-
ian banking  system and strengthening  its legal and regulatory
framework.  But Hungarian  banking suffers from market seg-
mentation  and high nominal  spreads,  caused by high inflation,
low leverage,  and nonperforming  loans.
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Banking reform started much earlier in Hungary  open branches or at least to establish fully owned
than in other socialist countries and Hungary  subsidiaries.
now has by far the most advanced system arnong
transitional socialist economies.  During the period under review, there was a
collapse of long-term lending, reflecting both
Vittas and Neal discuss recent trends in  conservative lending practices and a subdued
competition and efficiency in Hungarian bank-  demand for investment finance. But the use of
ing. They assess the performance of Hungarian  short-term credits has picked up considerably
banks and note the tremendous progress that has  since 1988, in line with the ongoing restructuring
been made in expanding the number of compet-  of dbe  Hungarian economy and the growth of
ing banks, strengthening the legal and regulatory  services.
framework, increasing the banks' managerial
autonomy, and promoting development of the  Reported nominal spreads and profit ratios
private sector.  appear to be high by international standards. For
small banks, these reflect the high level of
But Vittas and Neal also note that effective  inflation and the low level of leverage. But for
competition is constrained by the continuing  the large banks, the high nominal spreads may be
segmentation of the market. In addition to the  more apparent than real because of the existence
segmentation of corporate and household bank-  of nonperforming loans.
ing inherited from the old regime, a new seg-
mentation appears to have emerged, between  There is considerable uncertainty about the
large and small banks, or between old and new  size of nonperforming loans, following the
banks.  collapse of CMEA trade and its adverse impact
on corporate profitability. Tackling the problem
The entry of new banks - especially joint-  of nonperforming loans is important both for
venture banks - has a clear impact on market  enhancing the efficiency of banks and for
shares, but competition appears to be more  lowering nominal spreads, the high level of
effective in increasing the range of services than  which appears to hinder the financing of new
in lowering bank spreads. The impact of foreign  firms.
banks would be greater if they were allowed to
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This paper discusses  recent trends in competition  and efficiency  in Hungarian  banking. The
paper was completed  in the second half of 1991  and covers the period between 1987  and 1990. It is
based on a limited set of data on the operations  and profitability  of Hungarian  banks'.  Banking
performance  in Hungary is compared  with that of several developing  and developed  countries.
Banking  reform started much earlier in Hungary  than in other Eastern European  countries and
Hungary now has by far the most advanced  system in the region. Even before the creation  of the so-
called two-tier structure, the Hungarian  system had, in addition to the National Bank of Hungary
(NBH), a total of 14 institutions. These included  the Foreign Trade Bank, the National Savings  Bank
(NSB), 10 domestic institutions  operating  as specialized  finance institutes (SFIs), deposit associations
or innovation  funds and 2 joint venture banks (Citibank  and Unicbank). There were also 260 savings
cooperatives  and, at the other end of the spectrum, a joint venture offshore  bank with participation
from 5 foreign  banks.
The so-called  two-tier structure was created in 1987  with the transfer of most of NBH's
corporate banking  business  to three newly formed commercial  banks.  The number  of banking
institutions  continued  to expand  with the establishment  of new domestic  institutions  and the
authorization  of several new joint venture  banks.  The structure of the system was also affected  by the
conversion  of some SFIs into commercial  banks.  At the end of 1990, the banking  system, excluding
the NBH, the State Development  Institute and the savings cooperatives,  comprised  30 institutions,
namely, 4 large commercial  banks, 8 joint venture banks, 7 other commercial  banks (mostly  ex-SFIs),
2 savings banks and 9 SFIs (Table 1)2.
Entry continued  in 1991 with 6 more joint venture banks, including  a new banking  subsidiary
of IBUSZ, the travel company  that was successfully  privatized  and listed on the Budapest  Stock
Exchange  in 1990. IBUSZ  Bank plans to build a network of over 100 branches and to compete  in
retail banking. A total of 21 foreign banks, mostly  from neighboring  continental  European countries,
participate  in the Hungarian  banking  system. However, with few exceptions,  their impact  on the
market, in terms of product innovation,  modernization  of operations  and competitive  drive, is diluted
by their limited shareholdings  in joint venture banks.
Since the 1987  reform, banking institutions  operate under a sound regulatory framework  that
confers considerable  autonomy  to bank management,  even among  institutions  with substantial  state
ownership, and allows credit and other business  decisions  to be made on economic  criteria rather than
through policy direction. However, the banking  system continues  to suffer from problems inherited
from the old regime and has also been affected  by the difficulties  experienced  by the Hungarian
economy  during its transition to a market-oriented  system.  Moreover, the effectiveness  of the new
I  Given  the  rapid  pace  of change  and the  many  shortcomings  of the  accounting  data  used,  its findings  should
be treated  with caution.
2  A detailed  account  of the evolution  of the Hungarian  banking  structure  and the participation  of foreign
institutions  in joint venture  banks  is given  in Annex  1.
ITable  1
HUNGARY:  STRUCTURE  OF BANKING  SYSTEM.  1986-90
1986  1987  1988  1989  1990
Large  commercial  banks  1  4  4  4  4
Joint  venture  banks  2  2  5  5  8
Other  commercial  banks  2  2  2  7  7
Savings  banks  1  1  1  2  2
Specialized  finance  institutes  2  10  11  8  9
Deposit  associations  4  - - - -
Innovation  funds  2  - - - -
Total  14  19  23  26  30
laregulatory and supervisory  system remains  to be tested in practice. Implementation  is gradual and is
constrained  by the absence  of well trained and experienced  staff.
Under the recently approved  Banking  Act, banks are allowed  to operate as universal
institutions. The large banks have extensive  equity holdings in industrial and commercial  companies,
but otherwise  most banks are universal banks on paper only.  They lack the financial  and especially
hiuman  resources to play an active part in such areas as investment  banking and securities trading.
Even in the area of privatizations,  the role of the large banks is constrained  by the absence  of skilled
staff.
The licensing  of new banks is based on authorization  criteria that include a minimum  capital
of 1 billion HUF (about 15 million US dollars). Following  the enactment  of the Securities Markets
Act it is now possible to establish institutions  specializing  in investment  banking  or securities  trading
with a much smaller initial capital of only 50 million  HUF (700,000 US dollars). Several specialized
institutions  have been created, including  Credit Suisse First Boston, and these play an active part in
promoting  joint ventures in industry and commerce  and facilitating  the privatization  process.
Based on data compiled  by the NBH, year-end  total assets of commercial  banks and SFIs
increased from 1,004 billion HUF in 1987  to 1,621 billion HUF in 1990  or by 61%.  This is less
than the cumulative  rate of consumer  price inflation,  which totalled 75% between 1987 and 1990.
Thus, despite the large increase in the number  of banks, the real stock of bank assets suffered a
significant  decline. Average  total bank assets also fell from 72% of GDP in 1988 to 70% in 1990
(Figure 1).
In contrast, reported equity more than doubled  from 60 to 123 billion HUF.  However,
because of poor accounting  standards, it is doubtful  that this reprwsents  true equity.  The NBH data
are derived from financial statements  prepared  under Hungarian  accounting  standards. These are less
rigorous than generally  accepted international  accounting  standards in treating, inter alia, loan loss
provisions and interest accrual on nonperforming  loans.  Available  financial statements  for the four
large commercial  banks that have been prepared :nder international  accounting  standards (IAS)
corroborate the impression  of overstated  equity. The adjusted  equity ratio of the four banks under
LAS  data was 4.8% against a reported equity ratio of 7.8% under NBH data.
Although problem loans are likely to be significant,  there is considerable  uncertainty  over
their magnitude  and their effect on finarcial performance  ratios.  Problem loans are, in part, a legacy
of banking practices during the old economic  regime and, in part, a result of massive structural
changes  currently taking place in the Hungarian  economy. Since the three new large banks inherited
the portfolio, customer base and staff of the old state monobanking  system, problem loans tend to be
concentrated  in these banks.  Furthermore, problem loans are unevenly  distributed  among the large
banks, reflecting  the original division  of assets.  Additional  problem loans have arisen from the
collapse of the CMEA trade area and the abrupt reorientation  of industry and commerce  towards
Western markets.  New banks may also be experiencing  nonperforming  loans arising  from this,
though hard evidence  on their size is not readily available.
Competition
Competition  in the banking market has undoubtedly  increased as a result of new entry.  Thus,
the share of the four large commercial  banks in total assets fell from 58% in 1987 to 48% in 1990,
2Figure 1
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2awhile that of the small and medium-size  banks rose from 5% to 14%.  The share of savings banks
remained virtually  unchanged. SFIs play a very smal1  part in the system, accounting  for only 2% of
total assets.
Competition  has intensified  considerably  in some areas of corporate banking, especially  the
provision of working capital and trade finance and related financial  services. But because of the high
cost of building branch networks and the specialization  of most new banks in a narrow range of
services, it is less intense, though growing, in services  for small and medium-size  enterprises and
remains quite subdued  in retail banking.
The above quoted  data on market shares may, however, somewhat  overstate the increase in
competition  in Hungarian  banking. First, adding  the assets of the NSB to those of the four large
commercial  banks shows that the concentration  ratio of the big five banks fell from 93% in 1987  to
82% in 1990.
Second, despite  the expansion  of branch networks  by the large commercial  banks and growing
competition  from the Postabank  and the Bank for Savings Cooperatives,  the market for household
deposits continues  to be dominated  by the NSB.  There is, thus, a continuing  segmentation  of
corporate and household  banking.
Third, the market for corporate banking  services is also highly segmented. Foreign trade
finance and related services are effectively  dcminated  by the joint venture banks that offer better and
quicker services and have better access to international  banking  networks and correspondent
relationships. There is also some segmentation  by clientele. Old companies  continue  to bank with
the large commercial  banks, while newer companies  tend to deal with the jont  venture banks.
Fourth, several of the new domestic  commercial  banks come from the ranks of SFIs and
earlier deposit associations  and innovation  funds.  They are unlikely to be major sources of innovation
and operating efficiency  and to offer strong competition  to the larger banks by charging lower spreads
and/or offering a higher quality of service. At present, these banks account for less than 4% of total
assets against  over 9% for the joint venture banks.
Fifth, the market for payment services and related transaction  accounts  of the corporate sector
is dominated  by the large commercial  banks.  This is mainly due to the underdeveloped  state of
banking  infrastructure,  especially  the absence  of an efficient  payment system and active interbank
market.  This hampers smaller banks in effectively  competing  with the large banks by offering more
sophIsticated  payment and cash management  services.
The insufficient  level of competition  and innovation  may thus be attributed  to the
segmentation  of the market, the high level of market concentration  and the dominant  role played by
state-owned  or state-controlled  banks 3. With regard to market concentration,  it is worth emphasizing
that oligo,olistic markets need not necessarily  imply an uncompetitive  or inefficient  market.  Banking
and finance are essentially  contestable  industries  where the threat of potential  competition  from new
3  In Hungary, the banks have been converted into joint-stock companies  with considerable  nanagerial
autonomy, while state participation in their ownership has been reduced.  Nevertheless,  the banks are  still,
nominally  at least, under state control.
3entrants may be as important  in influencing  the behavior  of banks as the number  of actual competito.s
in the market.  For example,  the Canadian banking  system is highly concentrated  and dominated  by
six large banks.  Yet, studies of Canadhin  banking  have found it to be highly competitive 4. It is also
notable that in Canada, thne  Netherlands  and Sweden, where concentration  is quite high by
international  standards, banks operate with lower spreads and earn higher profits than in Italy,
Norway and the United  States, where banking  contzitration is low 5.
With regard to the role of public sector banks, the experience  of state-owned  banks in France
and Austria and of the savings  and cantonal  banks in Germany  and Switzerland  suggests  that state
ownership  of banking  institutions  is not necessarily  incompatible  with high operational  efficiency.
What seems to be required for efficiency  is that state-owned  or state-controlled  banks operate in a
competitive  environment,  enjoy managerial  autonomy  and independence  from political intervention,
and are accountable  to a nonpolitical  supervisory  authority.
In Hungary, it is the combination  of a high level of market concentration  with the dominant
role played by state-controlled  institutions  that implies  that competitive  forces may not be as strong
and responsive to changing  market conditions  as might be desired. This situation  is not uncommon  in
developing  countries. The banking  systems  of many countries  from Argentina  to Egypt, Pakistan, Sri
lanka and Tunisia exhibit similar structural features.
To strengthen  the impact  of competitive  forces, it is necessary  to increase the threat of
potential competition  by opening  market entry not only to joint venture banks but also to wholly-
owned subsidiaries  or branches  of foreign  banks, while to help large domestic  banks respond to the
challenge  of foreign competition  it is necessary  to accelerate  the commercialization,  restructuring  and
eventual  privatization  of most, if not all, state-owned  institutions.
Developing  countries  have traditionally  expressed  concern about the role and impact  of
foreign banks. This concern  reflects two, sometimes  contrary, fears.  First, there is concern  that
foreign banks may acquire dominant  positions in domestic  markets and drive out of business local
institutions  that are less efficient  and have fewer capital and managerial  resources. The second
criticism  is that foreign banks engage in 'cream skimming"  by dealing in profitable  segments  of the
market and capturing economic  rents resulting  from existing  regulations  or the inefficiency  of
domestic banks.
These concerns  were probably  justified during colonial  times when foreign banks behaved  like
colonial institutions  and exploited  local markets.  But experience  over the past two decades  or so
suggests  that the first concern is not justified, because foreign banks are unlikely to acquire dominant
positions in domestic  banking  systems, both because they are sensitive  to local political concerns  and
because  they may be deterred by the high capital and information  costs of building a strong presence
in retail markets.
4  For empirical  tests  of competition  and market concentration,  see Nathan and Neave (1989) and Shaffer
(1990).
5  For a discussion  of differences  in operating  costs and efficiency  among some developed  countries, see
Vittas (1991).
4On the allegation  of cream skimming,  there is some evidence  that foreign banks report higher
profits than domestic  banks, but the reasons for this are most likely their higher efficiency  over local
banks and the imposition  of restrictions  that provide regulatory rents to foreign banks.  The best
response  to cream skimming  is not to protect the position  of inefficient  domestic banks, but to remove
the restrictions  that give rise to regulatory rents and also to stimulate  efficiency  drives among
domestic banks.
Entry into Hungarian  bankinb .a, now free to institutions  that meet normal regulatory
requirements  such as minimum  capital, "fit and proper" management  and good computer systems.
However, entry of foreign banks, especially  through branches, is still highly restricted. This weakens
the competitive  challenge  to domestic  banks and is likely to delay the emergence  of a sound,
competitive  and efficient  banking  system.
Another aspect that weakens competition  in the market is the burden of nonperforming  loans.
As discussed  below, Hungarian  banks operate with high nominal spreads. These may be necessary  in
order to cover future losses from nonperforming  loans.  However, when spreads are unduly high,
good borrowers tend to subsidize  bad ones.  Under these conditions,  good borrowers would seek
finance outside the banking sector, either by issuing  commercial  paper and corporate bonds  or by
raising funds in the international  markets.
These potential developments  could create several problems. First, recourse to international
markets would raise issues of international  indebtedness  and would require appropriate  policies of risk
management  and hedging by the corporate sector that might not be readily developed  and
implemented.
Second, access  to the capital markets (domestic  or foreign) would be feasible only for the
largest and strongest of enterprises with the best credit ratings.  Their defection  to the capital markets
would weaken  further the quality of the loan portfolio of Hungarian  banks.
Third, the continuing  high cost of bank finance would hinder the financing  of new firms,
especially  in the industrial  sector where financial requirements  would be greater than those in the
trade and other service sectors.  Smaller firms would be penalized  by their inability  to access market-
based sources of finance.
All these factors suggest that dealing with the problem  of nonperforming  loans should be a
high priority in the process of creating a sound and competitive  banking market.
Credits
Available  NBH data report bank credits in forints to the enterprise sector 6 by size of bank.
The following  trends are highlighted. First, total fhrint credits to the enterprise  sector fell in real
terms between 1987  and 1990. Second, banks pla; A a growing emphasis  on conservative  lending
policies, increasing  their holdings of liquid assets and concentrating  on short-term  self-liquidating
loans.  Third, after suffering a big fall in 1988, short-term credits expanded  in real terms in 1989 and
6  The NBH data  refer to credits  to entrepreneurs.  Given  their size  this is taken  to represent  the whole
enterprise  sector,  including  state  owned  enterprises.
51990. Fourth, in contrast, long-term credits declined  in real terms.  Fifth, small and medium-size
banks achieved  a big increase in market share, especially  in short-term  credits.  And, sixth, savings
banks expanded  considerably  their involvement  in enterprise lending, especially  in long-term credits.
Enterprise credits represent only about one third of total bank assets. Their share in total
assets declined from 36% in 1987 to 30% in 1989  and 1990. The remainder  of assets is made up by
housing loans and holdings of housing  find bonds (mainly by the NSB and accounting  for about 22%
of total assets), interbank claims (in'.  Jing i, lances with the NBH), loans ir foreign currency 7, and
miscellaneous  assets.  For the large banks, total enterprise credits fell from 56% of total assets in
1989  to 43% in 1990. This reflects a shift away from lendir.g  toward liquid assets or other lines of
business,  such as leasing.
The NBH data show that total enteririse credits increased  by 35% between 1987 and 1990,
well below the cumulative  rate of consumer  price inflation  of 75% (Figure 2).  Even with regard to
produCer  price inflation,  which amounted  to 52% in cumulative  terms, there was a big decrease in the
real volume of forint credits.  Some of this fall has been made up by the rise in foreign currency
loans, especially  for foreign trade purposes, but as already noted data on their volume are not readily
available.
Total forint credits suffered a substantial  fall in 1988  when the large banks appear to have
drastically  curtailed  their short term credit facilities. ARter  1988, bank credits to the enterprise sector
rose by 42%.  This was still below cumulative  consumer  price inflation, which amounted  to 51%
between 1988 and 1990 and below cumulative  producer price inflation, which equalled  47%, but the
fall in real terms was much  lower on both indices. The share of large banks in net new lending, both
short and long-term, was only 3% against 52% for small and medium size banks and 43% for savings
banks.
Most of the competitive  action seems to have taken place in short-term credits. The share of
short-term credits in total credits to the enterprise sector rose from 50% to 57% - correspondingly  the
share of long-term credits fell from 50% to 43%.  Short-term credits accounted  for 76% of the
change in total credits outstanding  over the period 1987-1990. However, the total volume  of short-
term credits rose by 54%, which was substantially  less than cumulative  inflation. The large banks
accounted  for only 8% of the increase in short-term credits. Small and medium-size  banks
contributed  62% of the change, while saviri  -s  banks outperformed  the large banks by providing  27%
of the increase in short-term credits.
The relative increase in short-term credits in recent years is understated  by the collapse of
short-term  credits by the large banks in 1988. If the analysis  focusses  on the data between 1988  and
1990, the share of short-term credits in total credit growth was even greater at 87%.  Moreover, the
nominal growth of short-term credits between 1988 and 1990 was 84%.  Thus, short-term credits
expanded in real terms in the more recent period (Figure 2).
7  NBH data do not provide an  analysis of foreign currency  loans between  claims on banks and nonbanks.
Their  voiome  increased  considerably  since 1987  from 11%  of total loans (or 99%  of total  assets) in 1987  to 25% of
total loans (or 15% of total assets)  in 1990.
6Figure 2
Hungary:  Bank  Credits  to the  Enterprise  Sector
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6aThe small and medium sized banks, which are clearly the most dynamic segment  of the
market, were particularly aggressive  in grabbing market share for short-term credits.  Between 1987
and 1990, short-term  credits extended  by such banks grew 341  % in nominal terms and their market
share nearly trebled from 10% to 28'.
Long-term credits stagnated in nominal  terms, rising by less than 17% between 1987 and
1990. Thus, they fell drastically  in real terms. The savings banks accounted  for 91  % of the nominal
increase in long-term credits, while small and medium-size  banks contributed  21%.  In contrast, the
large banks registered a decline in their amounts  outstanding,  corresponding  to 14% of the rise in
long-term credits.
Despite  the impression  of increased competition  provided  by the aggressive  move by savings
banks into long-term credits to the enterprise  sector, this development  may be cause for concern.
Savings  banks have limited expertise in commercial  banking,  yet they appear to have extended within
three years over 150%  of their book equity in long-term  credits.  Charging  into a market with high
financial risks, which they may not be well equipped  to assess, and doing so at a time of great
economic  uncertainty  when other banks appear to be pulling back frrm long-term credits, does not
seem to meet the canons of banking  prudence. Savings  banks may have a comparative  advantage
over other banks in assessing  the value of real estate and they may have secured their long-term
credits with adequate  collateral,  especially  property. However, the absence  of clear property rights
over land and the considerable  uncertainty  over medium and long-term economic  prospects would
suggest  the need for greater caution in treading a path tFat other more experienced  banks are reticent
in following.
The emphasis  on short-term credits and liquid assets may reveal increased  conservatism  in the
large banks as they move to more autonomous  and independent  management. It may also represent a
cautious response  to the increased  uncertainty  and lack of adequate  information  about investment
prospects. Such a response is observed in many countries  following  the implementation  of financial
reform that eliminate  directed credit programs and leave banks with considerable  freedom in policy
making but little expertise and information  capital  on which to base their credit decisions.
The fall in the relative share of long-term credits may also be explained  by the weakness  of
investment  demand, especially  for long-term projects, which may be caused  by the current economic
uncertainty. It is notable  that many of the special facilities  introduced  in recent years to support the
development  of the private sector are moving slowly. The low demand for some of these facilities
may reflect, at least in part, their recent introduction,  inadequate  publicity  and unfamiliarity  of many
of the new eligible enterprises  with the tasks of c,mpiling financial  data and preparing convincing
loan application  forms.  For nonsubsidized  credits, a significant  factor may be the very high level of
market interest rates.  At nominal interest rates of 30% or more, bank loans were very expensive
when producer price inflation  was less than 22%.
In addition to focussing  on short-term lending, the banks appear to have reduced  or
withdrawn  credit facilities  from enterprises, especially  in 1988. This has given rise to an expansion
of inter-enterprise  credit and the so-called "queuing"  problem, a phenomenon  that endangers  the
solvency  and liquidity  of the enterprise sector and also undermines  the efficacy  of monetary policy.
The growth of inter-enterprise  credit implies considerable  bank disintermediation. But unlike othc.
countries where disintermediation  is caused by low interest rates on deposits and direct controls  on the
7allocation  of credit, in Hungary it seems to have originated  in the withdrawal  of credit facilities by the
banks and a concomitant  large expansion  of "aistress" trade credit.
The queuing  problem raises some interesting  questions  about the financial  state of industrial
and commercial  companies. It appears  to refer to the accumulation  of payment orders that are issued
by companies in favor of their suppliers but cannot be paid because of insufficient  bank balances  by
such companies. The qui .dng phenomenon  arises because banks delay execution  of payment orders
until their customers  receive  good funds from other firms.
However, data on the volume of payments  subject to the queuing  problem do not necessarily
indicate  the size of unpaid inter-enterprise  credits.  In the first place, companies  that are near the
point of failure may stop issuing payment  orders so that a substantial  part of uncollected  trade credit
will not be included in the data on queuing. Second, queuing  may affect enterprises  that face short-
term liquidity  problems  but may otherwise  be solvent  and even have good prospects. The growing
volume of queuing  provides an indication  of worsening  liquidity  problems  but says little about the
solvency  of the enterprise sector. For the latter, detailed studies on the prospects of individual
companies  and whole industrial  sectors would be necessary.
Liabilities
NBH data on deposits from the enterprise  sector and on NBH refinancings  also suggest  an
increase in bank competition  and market-orientation. Four main trends are highlighted. First, a
significant  decline  of bank reliance on NBH refinancing. Second, a rapid increase in the market share
of small and medium size banks.  Third, an increase in the borrow-back  ratio from the enterprise
sector, i.e. deposits taken from enterprises  as a ratio of the credits extended to them.  And, fourth, a
segmentation  of the market between  ordinary banking  services, such as checking accounts, and
services related  to trade finance.  The former seems to be dominated  by the large banks, whereas  the
new small and medium-size  banks, especially  the joint venture banks, appear to have a competitive
edge in the latter.
Reliance on NBH refinancing  declined  for the whole banking  sector.  After a substantial  fall
in 1988, the use of refinancing  facilities  grew more or less in line with total credits. In relation to
credits extended to the enterprise sectcr, refinancing  declined  from 70% in 1987  to 59% in 1990
(Figure 3).  This was caused  by the fall in the reliance  on refinancing  by the large banks from 71% to
62% of their credits.  In contrast, the small and medium-size  banks steadily increased  their NBH
refinancing  from 7% to 31% of their credits. Nevertheless,  this remains  only half of the
corresponding  ratio for the large banks.
A big part of the use of refinancing  facilities  by smaller banks is probably  accounted  for by
the commercial  banks that came from the ranks of SFIs.  For the savings  banks, the refinancing  ratio
was both high and quite volatile  from year to year.  Most likely, this was due to the use of
refinancing  facilities by the NSB for its loans to the nonbusiness  sector.
The recourse to central bank refinancing  also clearly declined  relative to enterprise deposits
and total assets.  This reflected strong growth in the mobilization  of business  deposits (69% growth
between 1987 and 1990). The small and medium  size banks were particularly  active, accounting  for
35% of the increase in deposits. As a result, their share trebled from 6% to 18%.  In contrast, the
share of the four large banks fell from 84% to 67%, although  they still accounted  for 42% of the
8Figure 3
Hungary:  NBH  Refinance,  Deposits  of the  Enterprise  Sector,
& Bank  Credits  to  te  Enterprise  Sector
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Refinance  Deposits  Total  Credit  Consumer  Prices
Total  14%  69%  35%  75%
Large  Banks  -11%  35%  1%
Small  & Medlum  Banks  1559%  396%  261%
Savings Banks & SF1s  204%  158%  1033%  Soure:  Natonal  Bank  of  Huna
Shares  & Borrow-Back  Ratio, 1987  versus 1990
Refinance  Deposits  Borrow-Back  Ratleo
1987  1990  1987  1990  1987  1990
Large  Banks  93%  72%  84%  67%  43%  58%
Srmall  & Msdum  Banks  1%  100%  bSo  18%  41%  57%
Savings  Banks  & SFIs  7%h  18%  10%  15%  304%  69%
Total  47%  59%
Source Natonal  Sank  ot  Hungary
8aincrease in deposits.  After rising from 9% to 22% of total business  deposits between 1987  to 1989,
the share of savings  banks fell back to 15% in 1990, following  an 11% decline in nominal  deposits.
Worth noting is the increase in the ratio of deposits taken from enterprises  to credits extended
to them from 47% in 1987 to-59% in 1990. This ratio, dubbed the borrow-back  ratio in this paper,
measures  what the banks borrow back from their business customers. It is positively  correlated with
the liquidity  of the enterprise sector.  The apparent increase in enterprise liquidity  is, at first blush,
inconsistent  with the widely  mentioned  problem of queuing. However, it may reflect an uneven
distribution  of liquidity  and financial  distress among  enterprises. For example,  distress may be
restricted  to certain firms in declining industries  or in regions facing economic  hardship; other firms,
especially in export-oriented  industries, tourism, construction,  and trade, that are not linked to the
distress sectors, may be buoyant.
Large banks are reported to still have the lion's share of business  checking accounts.
According  to market estimates,  they have over 70% of business  bank accounts. The large banks
derive substantial  profits from operating demand deposit  accounts  on which they pay low interest
rates.  The lack of a payment system infrastructure  limits the ability of other banks to compete
effectively  for such accounts.
However, there also appears  to be a functional  segmentation  of the market between large and
small banks as it is reported that many firms have accounts  with different banks.  They presumably
use the new banks for trade finance and other self-liquidating  short-term  credits and the large banks
for ordinary transaction  purposes.
A segmentation  of the banking market along these lines would be unlikely to persist in the
longer run.  Small and medium size banks are expected  to expand  their ordinary banking  business in
order to enhance their real profitability,  especially  following  the creation  of a giro payment system
that will speed up th- payment process and enable smaller banks to introduce  cash management
services and othe. payment-related  facilities.
Efrciency and Profitability
Available  aggregate  data on bank profitability  for different types of banks suffer from poor
accounting  standards and uncertainty  about the size of non-performing  loans.  For what is their worth,
the NBH data highlight the following  points.  First, Hungarian  banks operate, in general, with high
nominal spreads. Second, for the small and medium size banks, these are explained  by the high rate
of inflation  and their low leverage. Third, for the large commercial  banks, the high nominal spreads
cannot be fully explained  by the high rate of inflation  and their moderate level of leverage. These
banks either have large volumes  of nonperforming  loans or earn unusually  high profits.  Fourth, the
small banks earn low real equity returns, but the large banks report high levels of real profitability.
The latter may, however, be illusory  if nonperforming  loans are substantially  higher than what is
currently provided for.
The NBH data show that the nominal return on assets (ROA), based on average total assets,
was around 4% for the whole system.  Large banks were very close to the average, but small and
medium-size  banks earned ROAs of 7% in 1988 and 1989  and 6.4% in 1990.  Specialized  financial
institutions  also had high ROAs of over 6%, while  the ROAs of savings  banks rose from 2.3% in
91988  to 3.8% in 1989 and 3.6% in 1990. There was a general increase in nominal ROAs in 1989,
but not in 1990  despite the acceleration  of inflation  from 17% to 29% (Figure 4).
The large nominal  spread of small and medium-size  banks is primarily  explained  by the high
rate of inflation  and their low leverage.  The nominal ROAs are translated  into nominal ROEs of
between 30% and 35%.  For 1990 when consumer  prices rose by 29%, the real ROE was just 3.8%,
adequate  but far from impressive.  However, the real ROE was much higher at 11  % in 1988 and
1989 when inflation  was around 17%.
Applying the ROE analysis  set out in Annex 2 shows that with a leverage  of 4.3 and inflation
of 17% in 1989, the required nominal ROA for small ana z'edium-size  banks for a 10% targeted real
ROE would be 6.7%.  With leverage  rising to 5.5 but inflation  accelerating  to 29% in 1990, the
required nominal ROA for the same targeted  real ROE would rise to 7.6%.  As already noted,
nominal ROAs for small and medium-sized  banks fell from 7% in 1989 to 6.4% in 1990.
As the large banks operate with much higher leverage, their lower nominal  ROA is translated
into a much higher nominal ROE of over 50%.  Before  allowing  for the possible need for increased
provisions  against loan losses, this produced  in 1990  a real ROE of 18% and as high as 28% or more
in earlier years'.  With a leverage  of 11 and inflation  of 17%, the required nominal ROA for a 10%
targeted real ROE was 2.6% in 1989  instead of the realized 4.4%.  In 1990, the leverage  of the large
banks increased  slightly to 12 but with inflation  accelerating  to 29%, the required nominal ROA rose
to 3.5% against a realized one of 4.3% (always assuming  a targeted real ROE of 10%).
These levels of real profitability  would be very high by intemational  standards. However,
the true level of real profitability  would be much  lower if current levels of provisioning  were
inadequate  for covering loan losses from nonperforming  loans.  Nevertheless,  a preliminary
conclusion  that emerges from this analysis  of the NBH data is that the large Hungarian  banks either
have larger volumes  of nonperforming  loans than provided  for or earn unusually  high profits.  The
argument  that the high level of nominal spreads is fully explained  by the high leve! of inflation  and
low degree of leverage is not supported  by these data.
To help refine the assessment  of bank profitability,  financial data were compiled  for a subset
of Hungarian  banks for which IAS data were available. These cover seven banks (the four large
commercial  banks, two joint venture banks and the NSB) and largely corroborate  the above results,
although  they also underscore  some important  differences. The [AS data for the four large
commercial  banks give a (pre-tax) nominal ROA in 1990  of 3.2%.  This is 110 basis points lower
than the corresponding  figure based on NBH data.  Among other things, this reflects larger
provisioning  charges and deduction  of some accrued interest.
8  The  relationship  between  spreads,  leverage  and inflation  is discussed  in Annex  2.
9  NBH  data do not offer any indication  of gains resulting  from the  revaluation  of assets. With  inflation
running  at nearly  30  %,  revaluation  gains  on  fixed  assets,  trade  investments  and  equity  holdings  could  cover  anything
between  a quarter  and  a half, if not more,  of the erosion  of the real  value  of book  equity.
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% Return  on Average  Assets  *
- NBH  Data  -
1988  1989  19g0
Total  3.4%  4.4%  4.4%
Large Banks  3.8%  4.4%  4.3%
Smll  & Medium  Banks  7.0%  7.1%  6.4%
Savings Banks  2.3%  3.8%  3.6%
Special  Finance  Inst.  6.2%  3.4%  6.3%
SouroCw:  National  BankofHunary
Leverage:  Average  Assets  / Average  Equity  *
- N8H  Data  -
1988  1989  1990
Total  15.0  12.6  12.6
LargeBanks  13.5  11.3  12.1
Small  & Medium Benks  4.3  4.3  5.5
Savings Banks  78.4  55.6  36.8
Spedal Finance  Inst.  2.4  2.7  3.1
Sources:  Natonal  Bank  ol Hunga
% Return  on Average  Equity  *
- NBH  Data  -
Nominal  Real
19S8  1980  19  198  1989  1990
Total  51.4%  55.0%  54.9%  30.6%  32.4%  20.1%
Large  Banks  50.8%  49.5%  52.2%  30.0%  27.8%  18.0Yo
Small  & Medium  Banks  30.6%  30.6%  34.9%  12.6%  11.6%  4.6%
Savings  Banks  176.8%  212.7%h  134.0%o  138.7%  167.2%o  81.4%
Special  Finance  inst.  15.0%  9.4%  19.4%  .0.8%  -6.5%  -7.5%
Inflation In CPI  16.0%  17.0%  29.0%
Sourcas Nalonal  Bank  of Hungary
Before IAS adjustments  for non-performing  loans.
lOaThe four large banks have a mucn higher leverage  under IAS data, mainly because  of the
negative  impact of loan provisioning  and write-offs on their equity capital. With a leverage  of 21,
their nominal ROE was as high as 66% and their real ROE no less than 2)% (Figure 5).
The two small and medium-size  banks (both  joint venture banks), for which IAS data are
available, show a nominal ROA of 6. 1  %.  This is only 30 basis points lower than that obtained from
NBH data for all small and medium-size  banks.  With a leverage  of 6, the nominal ROE was 34%
and the real ROE 4%, again very close to the NBH data.
The IAS data for the NSB show big differences  from the NBH data on savings banks,
especially  regarding the degree of leverage  and the nominal  ROE.  Thus, the leverage  cf the NSB was
only 26 under IAS data against 37 (for the two savings  banks) under NBH data.  The ROA was
slightly  lower at 3.2% compared  to 3.6% but the pre-tax ROE for the NSB under IAS definitions  was
82.6% against 134% for the savings banks under the NBH definitions.
The IAS data include both pre and post tax figures.  The two small and medium-size  banks
covered by the data had a relatively light tax burden that amounted  to less than 9% of their pre-tax
profits.  This is explained  by the special tax holidays  granted to banks with foreign participation. In
contrast, the large Hungarian  banks and the NSB are heavily taxed.  Their tax burden equaled  43%
and 53% respectively  of their reported pre-tax net income.
IAS data confirm the impression  of high nominal spreads and ROAs for all groups of banks
and high real ROEs for all the banks, except the small and medium size banks that operate with
unusually  low leverage. However, these data are also subject to the large uncertainty  regarding  the
true level of nonperforming  loans.  The operating ratios of Hungarian  banks will be much worse if
nonperforming  loans turn out to be larger than provided for.  The likelihood  that this may be the case
has increased  substantially  as a result of the collapse of trade with the old Soviet block.
Assessing  the impact of a bigger volume of nonperforming  loans, and therefore of the
adequacy  of spreads and profit levels, is difficult without  detailed information  about provisioning
policies.  However, assuming that the 39 billion HUF of total provisions  shown in the 1990  IAS
accounts were obtained by applying  a 60% average level of provisioning  would imply a recognized
volume of nonperforming  loans of 65 billion HUF or about 12.5% of the total loans of 515 billion
HUF of the four large banks.  If the true level of nonperforming  loans was substantially  higher than
this, both reported profits would be reduced by the suspension  of interest accrual on the additional
nonperforming  loans and the banks' capital would be eroded  by the need to make large additional
provisions.
According  to LAS  data, the four large banks earned total profits, before provisions for loan
losses, taxes and dividends, of just over 28 billion HUF in 1990. They used 6 billion for new
provisions, were taxed to the tune of 9 billion HUF and paid dividends  of 6 billion HUF.  Their
retained earnings amounted  to nearly 7 billion HUF.
But, with inflation  running at nearly 30%, their retained earnings  would need to be about 10
billion HUF to maintain the real value of equity. This would leave 12 billion HUF for additional
provisions  and suspension  of interest accrual. With an average lending rate of 28.6% for 1990 and
an assumed average level of provisioning  of 60%, the available  funds would cover an increase in
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Return  on Assets
- IAS Data  -
1990  1990  #of
pre-tax  post-tax  InstiutIons
Total  3.2%  1.8%  7
Large  Banks  3.1%  1.8%  4
Small  & Medium  Banks  6.1%  5.6%  2
Savings  Banks  3.2%  1.5%  1
Sources:  National  Bank  of Hungary  and  Bank  Staff Estirates
Leverage
- IAS Data  -
1990
Total  21.0
Large Banks  21.0
Small & Medium Banks  5.6
Savings  Banks  25.8
Sources:  N.tlonal  Bank  of Hungary  and  Bank  Sal  Estinates
Return  on Equity
- IAS  Data  -
- Nominal  - - Real  -
1990  1990  1990  1990
pre-tax  post-tax  pre-tax  post-tax
Total  68.0%  37.4%  30.2%/  6.5%
Large  Banks  65.9%  37.5%  28.6%  6.6%
Small  & Medium  Banks  34.2%  31.3%  4.0%  1.8%
Savings  Banks  82.6%  38.9%  41.6%  7.7%
1990  Consumer  Price  Inflation  29.0%
Souroes:  National  Bank  of Hungary  and  Bank  Staff  Estrnates_>
llanonperforming  loans of only 13.5 billion HUF.  Anything  higher than that would cause an erosion of
the real equity of the banks' 0.
Thus, the apparent high spreads leave little room for an increased  volume  of nonperforming
loans.  Moreover, there are several reasons to suggest that the banks may not be able to sustain their
present spreads.  First, as inflation  slows down, the banks will benefit less from the current high
spreads between average lending rates and rates paid on demand deposits. Second, bank overhead
costs will rise as the banks develop  their branch networks  and install expensive  computer systems and
banking  technology. Third, competition  for loan and other business is likely to intensify  further.
Although spreads have not declined so far despite the increased number  of competing  banks, this may
well change in the future.
Thus, action to tackle nonperforming  loans and recapitalize  the large banks may be required
at an early stage. The Hungarian  authorities  have already approved  the issue of NBH guarantees to
cover 50% of bad loans inherited  by the large banks in 1987  and estimated  at about 21 billion HUF.
However, this measure would clearly  prove inadequate  if nonperforming  loans turn out to be much
higher than allowed under current provisioning  policies.
Revenues and Costs
The data provided  by NBH do not contain  a detailed  breakdown  of income  and expense  items.
An analysis  of operating income ratios and intermediation  spreads is not possible for the whole
banking sector.  The LAS  accounts  contain data on costs and revenues  for the seven banks for which
such accounts are available. However, even IAS data suffer from many disaggregation  problems and
make difficult  a meaningful  analysis  of revenues  and costs. For example, very large expense items
appear in some of the financial  statements  under the heading  of "other expenses" or "other operating
expenses". The result is that assumptions  made regarding  the treatment of these expenses greatly
influence  operating cost ratios.
The data on revenues  and costs highlight  the following  points.  First, Hungarian  banks have
high shares of fee-based  incomes. This is partly attributed  to the tendency of banks to charge for all
types of services that in more mature Western European markets  tend to be provided free of charge.
Second,  joint venture banks operate with unusually  low cost/income  ratios.  Third, the gross income
margin of the large banks is divided  between a direct cost of intermediation  of 5.9% and a cost of
capital of 1.8%.  And, fourth, the large banks incur a heavy burden of taxation  that amounts in total
to 3.4% of assets.
to  In  many developing countries undergoing extensive economic restructuring, it  is often argued that
nonperforming  loans may be as high as 30% of total loans and may require a 60% average level of provisioning.
Applying  these  proportions  to the large Hungarian  banks would imply nonperforming  loans of 150 billion HUF,
an increase  of 85 billion HUF over those already provided for.  Interest suspension  on these loans would amount
to 24 billion HUF and required  new provisions  to 51 billion HUF.  These would produce a net loss of 53 billion
HUF for 1990 against equity capital of 37 billion HUF.  Even before additional provisions, the suspension  of
interest accral  would produce a net loss of 2 billion  HUF.
12The IAS data show that the four large commercial  banks had arn  average interest margin of
4.8% in 1990. Adding net fee and other income  of 2.9% raises the gross income margin to 7.7%.
The large banks also had relatively large total expenses (including  provisions for loai' losses) of 4.5%
of average total assets, resulting in a pre-tax ROA of 3.2%.  The four large banks also had a total
cost/income  ratio of 59%, leaving them with a high pre-tax profit ratio of 41% (Figure 6).  The
relatively low cost/income  ratio and their high profit ratio reflect  the largely wholesale  nature of their
business. This is further underlined  by the high level of noninterest  income, which contributed  38%
of gross income. The four large banks earned a pre-tax ROE of 66%.  Allowing  for inflation,  this
amounted  to a real pre-tax ROE of nearly 29%.
The two smaller banks covered in the sample of banks with IAS accounts  reported an average
interest margin of 6.5%, a gross income  margin of 8.3%, a total cost to assets ratio of 2.2% and a
pre-tax ROA of 6.1  %.  Their total cost/income  ratio was 26.4% and their pre-tax profit ratio an
extremely  high 73.6%.  Despite  these impressive  operating asset and income ratios, the small banks
earned rather low real ROEs.  As already discussed  above, this was mainly due to their high leverage
in conjunction  with the high rate of inflation. It is worth noting that despite their reliance on trade
finance and modern financial services, their noninterest  income contributed  only 21  % of gross income
or nearly half the level reported by the four large commercial  banks.
The operating asset ratios of the NSB reflect its involvement  in housing finance, although  its
operating costs are probably  understated in the analysis  undertaken  in this paper.  The item "other
operating expenses" mostly covers expenses  relating  to nonbanking  activities, such as the construction
of flats, and for this reason two-thirds  of such expenses  have been netted out from noninterest
income.  It is not clear to what extent the one-third of other operating expenses  that is treated as
banking  operating expenses provides an understatement  or overstatement  of such costs.  On this basis,
the NSB reported in 1990 an interest margin of 2.7% of average total assets and a gross income
margin of 7.9%.  Deducting  total costs of 4.7%, leaves  a pre-tax ROA of 3.2%.  The total
cost/income  ratio of the NSB was only 59%, resulting in a pre-tax profit ratio of 41  %.  It is
interesting  to note that net noninterest  income amounted  to 65% of gross income, which is much
higher than the corresponding  ratio for the four large commercial  banks and is unusually  high by
international  standards. However, the share of noninterest  income, the gross income margin and the
cost/income  ratio are highly sensitive  to the treatment  of other operating expenses. On the other
hand, neither the ROA nor the ROE would be affected. The pre-tax ROE of the NSB was an
impressive  82.6%, corresponding  to 41.6% in real terms.
The data on costs and revenues  allow an analysis  of the gross income of banks between the
direct cost of intermediation  and the cost of capital. In the case of the large Hungarian  commercial
banks, their gross income margin is divided between  a direct cost of intermediation  of 5.9% and a
cost of capital of 1.8% of average total assets (Figure ??). The former consists  of staff costs (0.6%),
depreciation  Qess than 0.1%), other operating expenses  (3.0%), annual provisions (0.9%) and income
taxes (1.3%).  The latter is allocated  between  dividends (0.8%) and retained  earnings (1.0%).
The data also allow an assessment  of the impact  of explicit and implicit  taxes.  These include
taxes on bank income, dividends  paid to the state, the opportunity  cost of reserve and liquidity
requirements  and the effect on taxes on interest income earned by households'".
"  The  large  banks held virtually no household  deposits  and were not affected by this tax.
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Hungary:  Operating  Asset  and  Income  Ratios
- IAS  Dati  -
All  Large  Small & Med.  Savings
Banks  Banks  Banks  Banks
(7)  (4)  (2)  (1)
Operating  Asset Ratios
(% of average  total assets)
Interest  Margin  4.0  4.8  6.5  2.7
Non-interest  Margin  3.8  2.9  1.8  5.2
Gross  Income  Margin  7.8  7.7  8.3  7.9
Operating  Costs  3.8  3.6  1.7  4.2
Provisions  0.7  0.9  0.5  0.5
Total  Costs  4.5  4.5  2.2  4.7
Pre-tax  ROA  3.3  3.2  6.1  3.2
Operating Income Ratios
(%  of gross  inoome)
Non-interest  Income  48.4  38.1  21.4  65.4
Total  Cost  58.3  59.2  '  59.4
Pre-tax  Profit  41.7  40.8  73.6  40.6
Operating Equity Ratios
(% of average equity)
Pre-tax  Nominal  ROE  68.0  65.9  34.2  82.6
Pre-tax  Rea ROE  30.2  28.6  4.0  41.6
Sources:  Bank  Staff  Estimates
13aFigure 7
Hungary:  Sources  and Disposition  of  Commercial  Bank  Revenues
- % of  Average  Total  Assets  (699,137  BHUF)  -
(basP-  cn 1990  IAS  Data  for  the  four  largest  commerdal  banks)
Net Interest  Margin  Direct  Cost of Intermediatlon
interest  income,,  15.4  0.6  staff  costs ..:,:4.8  :  .
interest  expense  10.6  0.0  depreciabon
5.9  3.0  other  operating  expenses
0.9  provisions
7.7  . 1.3  income  taxes
Gross  Operati,ng
Income
Net Non-Interest  Income
netfeeincome ss;.  5.  13  Cost of Capital
other  net non-interestincome  1.6  .9  0.8  dividends
foreign  exchange  valuation  gans  0.1  1.0  retained  earnings
Direct  and Implict  Taxes
-%  of average -
assets  deposits
1.)  income  taxes  1.3
2.)  dividends  paid  to State  0.3
3.)  cost  of required  reserves  1.4  4.3
4.)  cost  of required  liquidity  0.3
5.)  tax on household  interest  earnings  0.0  0.0
Sum  3.4
Sources:  Banks  Sft  EstmaleFor the four banks, income taxes in 1990  amounted  to 1.3% of assets.  With an estimated
direct state ownership  of 42%, dividends  paid to the state represe, Led  0.3%t2. The opportunity  cost
of reserve and liquidity  requirements  depends  on the difference  between  the rate earned on such
requirements  and market rates of interest. In Hungary, banks were required in 1990 to maintain
noninterest-earning  reserves equal to 15% of their forint deposits. With an average loan rate of
28.6% for the year, the cost of reserve requirements  amounted  to 1.4% of average assets".  Ibe
opportunity  cost of the 5% liquidity requirement  is estfmated  at 0.3% of assets on the assumption  that
such liquid assets earned the basic NBH rate of 22% against  an average loan rate of 28.6%.  In total
the explicit and implicit taxes borne by the four large banks amounted  to 3.4% of assets.
International  Comparisons
Comparing  bank efficiency  across countries  is fraught with many difficulties. Because  of
differences in capital structure, product mix and accounting  conventions,  bank operating  ratios  can
provide only a rough indication  of bank efficiency. Their assessment  and interpretation  requires  a
detailed knowledge  and understanding  of both banking  structure and hanking practice in different
countries.
Three types of bank operating ratios can be used: operating asset ratios, which relate revenues
and expenses to average total assets;  operating income  ratios, which relate revenues  and expenses to
gross income (defined as the sum of net interest income and net noninterest income);  and operating
equity ratios, which relate revenues and expenses  to average equity.
Differences  in capital structure tend to have a big impact  on operating asset and income
ratios. Thus, banks with a higher equity capital and lower leverage  tend to report higher operating
asset and income ratios.  This is because  banks witL  a higher equity capital need to borrow less in
ordez  to support a given level of assets and this is reflected in higher interest and gross income
margins as well as ROAs.  Because  they report a higher gross income margin, such banks also show
a lower cost/income  ratio.  However, for given spreads between loan and deposit  rates, the ROEs of
low leverage  banks tend to be lower than those of banks with higher leverage.
Differences in business  mix also affect operating  ratios.  Banks with extensive  participation  in
retail business, which incurs higher processing and monitoring  costs and involves  higher margins  than
wholesale  business, tend to operate with higher margins  and other operating asset ratios.  They also
show high cost income ratios.  But it does not follow that they are necessarily  less efficient than
banks with low margins and low cost/asset  ratios.  In fact, banks with substantial  differences in
product mix may report similar ROAs and ROEs even though they may have vastly different income
margins  and cost/income  ratios.
12  This understates  the amount  of dividends  accruing  to the state because  a large share of the remaining  equity
of the banks is held by state owned enterprises.
13  The reserve requirement  tax was lowered in 1991 when the NBH started paying interest on reserve
balances,  initially at 15.4% (70% of the NBH  basic rate of 22%) and since October 1991  at 10.5% (50% of the
slightly lowered basic rate of 21%).  The NBH also imposed a  15% reserve requirement  on foreign  currency
deposits.
14Bank operating ratios may further be distorted  by differences  in accounting  practices
regarding  the valuation  of assets (book rather than market value or replacement  cost), treatment of
depreciation  and other reserves (as liabilities  rather than asset offsets), level of loan loss provisioning
(inadequate  provisioning  inflating  the book value of loans and equity as well as overstating all income
and profit ratios of banks), and use of hidden reserves.  For developing  countries  where banks may
have large unprovided  nonperforming  loans, inadequate  provisioning  may seriously distort reported
operating ratios.
Finally, a very important  factor affecting  the level of bank operating  ratios is the range and
quality of services offered by banks.  Banks  that offer a limited range of services, operate a small
number of branches, do not use computerized  facilities, and rely on labor-intensive  and slow
processing  methods will tend to have low operating costs, especially  if thev operate in countries  with
low wages and low rents.  However, such banks transfer many of the operating costs of banking  to
their customers  in the form of inconvenient  location  of branches and long and slow moving lines.
Their low cost ratios would not be an indication  of operating  efficiency.
A comparison  of bank operating ratios in Hungary  and selected  developed and developing
countries  provides interesting  insights but needs to be interpreted  with great caution" 4. Banks in
Germany, the Netherlands,  France, and Canada reported during the period 1985-89  interest margins
betweern  2% and 3%, gross income margins  between  2.5% and 3.5%, and ROAs between  0.6% and
i%.  On the other hand, banks in the United States, the United Kingdom, Italy and Spain operated
with much higher ratios ranging  up to interest margins  of 4% and gross income margins  of well over
5%, although  their ROAs were not higher than 1.25%.  Banks in Austria and France operate with
low ROAs, which are largely explained  by their very high leverage.
Among  developing  countries, banks in Turkey report high gross income margins, followed  by
Moroccan and Portuguese  banks.  Turkish banks also report very high ROAs. However, among  all
the countries surveyed in this paper, Hungarian  banks have by far the highest gross income margins
and ROAs. The interest margins  of Hungarian  banks (based on IAS data for 1990)  were well over
4% (except for the NSB), their gross income margins around 8% and their ROAs over 3%.  Indeed,
the joint venture banks reported ROAs of over 6%.To a large extent, these are explained  by the low
leverage  and high inflation. But a significant  part must be attributed  either to the need to provide
against  unrecognized  nonperforming  loans or to high levels  of real profitability.
Except for the American banks, which suffered from large volumes  of nonperforming  loans
during this period and were forced to make unusually  large provisions,  the ratios of most other banks
reflect their business  mix, with banks that have a greater exposure to high cost/high margin business
generally reporting higher operating asset ratios.  Worth noting is the experience  of the UK building
societies, which h.  - traditionally  specialized  in housing  finance, a market with low margins and low
costs.  They had a gross income margin of only 2.4% but a ROA of over 1.25%.
14  Bank operating ratios in some developed  countries and the problems of international  comparisons  are
extensively  reviewed in Vittas (1991), while detailed  data for most OECD countries  are reported  in OECD (1991).
Those for developing  countries are obtained from various World Bank reports.  Annex 3 provides tables with
detailed  data on bank operating  ratios for selected  developed  and developing  countries.
15The operating income ratios of banks in developed  countries  show that American and British
banks relied to a greater extent on fee-based  income  than banks in continental  European countries.
For the American  money center banks, the share of fee-based  income was 46%.  Among developing
countries, banks in Egypt and Greece have high levels of fee-based  income. In Egypt, this was due
to limits on interest spreads and to a high level of regulated commivsions. In Greece, it was partly
caused  by the suspension  of interest accrual  on large volumes  of nonperforming  loans.  Among
Hungarian  banks, the noninterest  income of the NSB was very high, but this reflected its involvement
in nonbanking  business. The four large commercial  banks generated  38% of their gross income from
fee-based  services.
The total cost/income  ratios of banks in developed  countries, including  operating costs and
provisions, range between 75% and 85% of gross income. The only exceptions  are the UK building
societie, with a low cost ratio of only 48% and the American  money center banks with an unusually
high ratio of 92%.  The latter has been caused  by the large volume  of provisions at 25% of gross
income. Hungarian  banks at 59% generally  had low total cost/income  ratios.  Worth noting is the
very low cost/income  ratio of the 2 joint venture banks.  At 26% these must rank among the lowest
such ratios anywhere  in the world.  This is clearly related to the limited  range of their services, their
limited branch networks and their generally  high level of operating efficiency  as well as their low
leverage".
ROE analysis  provides a combination  of ratios that may best summarize  the various operating
ratios of banks and may be very useful in analyzing  differences  in performance  across groups of
banks or across countries. ROE analysis  is based on two fundamental  identities  of bank operating
ratios. First, the ROA is equal to the product of the gross income margin (gross income as a
proportion  of total assets) and the profit ratio (net income as a proportion  of gross income);  and
second, the ROE is equal to the product of the ROA and bank leverage  (i.e. the inverse of the equity
capitalization  ratio)" 6.
The ROE analysis  for Hungarian  banks (Table 2) shows clearly the positive impact of low
leverage  on the profit ratio, gross margin and ROA of the joint venture banks.  Yet, their real ROE is
very low.  The ROE analysis for banks in high income  countries (Table 3) also shows that smaller
banks which have lower leverage  require a bigger ROA to achieve  a given ROE than large banks
which operate with higher leverage. Banks in France and Austria report satsifactory  ROEs despite
their low ROAs because of their high leverage.
Similarly, banks with a higher profit ratio require a higher gross margin to achieve  a given
level of ROA than banks with a lower profit ratio.  The last point is clearly seen by contrasting  the
experience  of two groups of institutions  that have very similar ROAs but big differences in their profit
ratios and gross income margins: the UK building societies, which have a profit ratio of 52% and a
gross income margin of 2.4% and the Spanish commercial  banks, which report a profit ratio of 24%
and a gross income margin of 5%.
'5  It is emphasized  that  low leverage  inflates  gross  income  and therefore  compresses  the cost/income  ratio.
IG  In algebraic  notation,  if P stands  for net  income,  G for gross  income,  E for equity  and A for total  assets,
the first identity stteshtat P/G * G/A = P/A and the  second  that  P/A * A/E = P/E.
16Table  2
ROE Analysis: Banks in Selected Develooina Countries
Profit  Gross  ROA  Leve  Nominal Real
Ratio  Margin  rage  ROE  ROE
Hunaarv 11990)
Large commercial banks  40.8  7.70  3.14  21.0  65.9  28.6
Joint Venture Banks  73.6  8.30  6.11  5.6  34.2  4.0
Savings Banks  40.6  7.90  3.21  25.8  82.6  41.6
EavDt 11986-90)
Public sector banks  23.4  3.04  0.71  52.9  37.6  14.7
Large JV banks  38.5  3.84  1.48  16.5  24.4  3.7
Small and medium banks  27.8  4.06  1.13  14.5  16.4  -3.3
Foreign banks  20.8  3.89  0.81  16.4  13.3  -5.6
Portuaal 11985-89)
Commercial banks  14.7  4.01  0.59  12.4  7.3  -4.6
Greece  (1985-89)
Large >.ommercial  banks  12.3  3.02  0.37  39.7  14.7  -2.2
Turkey (1985-89)
Commercial banks  34.6  6.47  2.24  24.5  54.9  2.0
Morocco 11988-90)
Large commercial banks  31.0  4.20  1.30  16.8  21.8  17.0
Thailand 11986-88)
Commercial banks  17.9  3.13  0.56  19.2  10.8  7.9
16aTable 3
ROE Analysis: Banks in Selected Hiah Income Countries
Profit  Gross  ROA  Leve  Nominal  Real
Ratio  Margin  rage  ROE  ROE
United States 11985-89)
All commercial banks  16.1  4.91  0.79  16.2  12.8  9.3
Small banks  18.2  4.89  0.89  12.3  10.9  7.5
Medium banks  18.4  5.06  0.93  15.3  14.2  107
Money center banks  7.6  4.58  0.35  21.8  7.6  4.3
Other large banks  14.7  4.84  0.71  18.5  13.1  9.6
Germany (1985-891
All commercial banks  23.8  2.94  0.70  21.5  15.1  12.5
Big commercial banks  24.9  3.58  0.89  21.4  19.0  16.3
Savings banks  23.7  3.38  0.80  26.7  21.3  18.6
Credit cooperatives  19.1  3.46  0.66  26.0  17.1  14.5
Giro landesbanks  26.1  0.88  0.23  43.5  10.0  7.5
United Kinadom  (1985-89)
Large commercial banks  17.1  4.92  0.84  19.9  16.7  10.7
Building societies  52.1  2.40  1.25  23.3  29.1  22.5
Spain !1986-891
Commercial banks  23.8  5.01  1.19  15.3  18.2  9.6
Savings banks  18.5  5.69  1.05  16.7  17.5  9.0
Canada (1984-881
Domestic banks  24.3  3.75  0.91  20.7  18.8  14.8
Foreign banks  24.1  2.45  0.59  13.4  7.9  4.3
Netherlands  (1985-891
Commercial banks  25.7  2.76  0.71  25.0  17.8  16.6
Savings banks  29.6  3.41  1.01  12.1  12.3  11.2
Italy (1985-891
All commercial banks  22.0  4.50  0.99  15.6  15.4  8.7
Large commercial banks  17.3  4.13  0.72  18.7  13.4  6.8
Savings banks  23.5  5.08  1.19  15.5  18.5  11.6
Austria  (1985-89)
Large commercial banks  24.0  1.58  0.38  30.7  11.6  9.2
Savings banks  22.9  2.26  0.52  27.0  14.0  11.5
France (1985-891
Commercial & mutual banks 13.4  2.88  0.38  37.7  14.5  10.5
Large commercial banks  10.9  2.84  0.31  48.3  14.9  10.9
16bThus, by comparison  to banks in selected  developed  and developing  countries, the operating
asset ratios of Hungarian  banks appear to be rather high.  The higher ratios may partly be explained
by the higher rate of inflation  of the Hungarian  economy  and partly by the higher level of
nonperforming  loans.  But they may also reflect lower operating efficiency  as well as the
segmentation  of the banking  market and less intense competition. The real ROEs of the large
Hungarian  banks are much higher than those of most groups of banks in other countries. Yet, as the
analysis  of the preceding sections  suggests,  this high level of real profitability  would be illusory if
nonperforming  loans turned out to be higher than allowed  for.
Conclusions
The data analyzed  above underscore  a number  of policy issues:
*  First, despite  the large increase in the number  of banks, competition  is constrained  by
the continuing  segmentation  of the market. Several of the new banks come from the
ranks of SFIs and earlier deposit associations  and innovation  funds.  They are unlikely
to be major sources of innovation  and competition,  at least in the near future.  In
addition to the segmentation  of corporate and household  banking  that has been
inherited  from the old regime, a new segmentation  between  large and small banks, or
between  old and new banks, also appears  to have emerged.
*  Second, the entry of new banks, especially  joint venture banks, is having  a clear
impact  on market shares, but competition  appears  to be more effective  in increasing
the range of services  than in lowering  bank spreads.  The large banks appear to have
opted for relatively  high spreads and not for fighting  back to defend  their market
position. For their part, the new  joint venture banks are not undercutting  the big
banks. Rather, because  of their low leverage  and the high level of inflation, they
seem to charge high nominal spreads. Their success in gaining market share may be
based on providing  better quality through faster and more reliable service. As their
leverage  grows, these banks will be able to achieve  higher levels of real profitability
and in due course they may also lower their spreads. For this to happen, there must
be greater effective  competition  between  small and large banks as well as among  small
banks.
*  Third, the continuing  authorization  of joint venture banks, the number of which has
reached 14 at the latest count, is bound to stimulate  further competition  and
innovation. However,  the impact  of foreign banks would be greater if they are
allowed  to open branches  or at least to establish  fully-owned  subsidiaries.
*  Fourth, the data indicate  a collapse of long-term  lending, especially  by the large
banks.  This may reflect a conservative  approach by the banks now that they are
independently  managed. Conservative  lending  practices  are most probably  reinforced
by the lack of information  capital (e.g. up-to-date  data on enterprise  credit, analyses
of sectoral prospects, etc.).  The decline in long-term  credit may also reflect a weak
demand for investment  finance, resulting  from economic  uncertainty  during the
transition to a market-based  system. The authorities  have introduced  several credit
facilities to encourage  the provision  of long-term  credits. The take-up of these credit
17facilities appears  to be slow.  A question  of major importance  regards initiatives  that
could be taken to expand  the information  capital  of banks and improve their ability  to
assess the creditworthiness  of different projects and monitor the performance  of
borrowers.
*  Fifth, in contrast to long-term  credits, the use of short-term credits has picked up
considerably  after 1988. This is associated  with the ongoing  restructuring  of the
Hungarian  economy  and enterprise sector and provides optimism  for the future.
Despite  their size, the large banks do not occupy a dominant  position in this market.
*  Sixth, reported nominal and real profitability in the banking  sector appear to be quite
high.  The high spreads are only partly explained  by the low level of leverage and the
nigh rate of inflation. Moreover, the present  high spreads may not be sustainable
given the likely increase in overhead  costs and the intensification  of competition.
*  Seventh,  the true level of profitability  clearly  depends on the size of nonperforming
loans.  Even a small increase in nonperforming  loans above what is already provided
for would lower profits substantially. If nonperforming  loans turn out to be
substantially  higher, not only the profits but also the equity of banks would be
seriously eroded.
Eighth, there is considerable  uncertainty  about  the level of nonperforming  loans,
which has clearly been affected  by the collapse of CMEA trade and its adverse impact
on corporate  profitability. Failure to tackle the problem of nonperforming  loans
would hinder the financing  of new firms.
18ANNEX I
THE EVOLVING  STRUCTURE  OF HUNGARIAN  BANKING
Prior to the establishment  of the two-tier structure, the banking  system comprised, in addition
to the National Bank of Hungary (NBH), 1 large commercial  bank (the Foreign Trade Bank), 2 joint
venture banks (Citibank  and Unicbank), 1 savings bank (the National  Savings Bank- NSB) and 10
domestic institutions  that operated mostly as specialized  finance institutes (SFIs), innovation  funds or
deposit associations. There was also one offshore bank (the Central European  Investment  Bank).
In 1987, the number of institutions  increased  to 19, following  the creation of the two-tier
system that transferred most of the NBH's corporate banking  business  to three newly formed
commercial  banks (the Hungarian  Credit Bank, the Commercial  and Credit Bank, and the Budapest
Bank) and the establishment  by one of the latter of two subsidiaries  that operated as SFIs.  In the
same year the pre-existing deposit  associations  and innovation  funds were also converted into  joint
stock companies  and operated formally as SFIs.
In 1988, 3 new  joint venture banks were authorized  (Interbank,  later renamed Inter-Europa
Bank, Postabank and Central European Credit Bank), while 1 more SFI was established  by another of
the large commercial  banks.
1989 saw the creation of a further 3 institutions,  bringing  the total to 26.  These included  one
savings  bank (the Bank for Savings Cooperatives)  and 2 SFIs (one was a subsidiary  of the third large
commercial  bank and the other a joint venture with foreign interests). A major change also occurred
with the conversion  of 5 SFIs into commercial  banks with universal  banking licenses. Most of these
originated  from the old deposit associations  and innovation  funds, .
Finally, in 1990 3 more joint venture banks were authorized  (the General Banking  and Trust
Co., Creditanstalt  and Leumi Credit Bank) and 2 new SFIs.  At the same time, another SFI was
converted into a commercial  bank.
Thus, at the end of 1990  the Hungarian  banking  system consisted  of 4 large commercial
banks, 8 joint venture banks, 7 other commercial  banks, 2 savings  banks, and 9 SFIs, giving a total
of 30 institutions. In addition to these, there is the NBH, the State Development  Institute  that was
created in 1987, and 260 savings cooperatives.
Entry continued in 1991  with 6 more  joint venture banks, including  Ibusz Bank, a subsidiary
of the travel company  that was successfully  privatized and listed on the Budapest  Stock Exchange  in
1990.
Foreign bank participation  through  joint venture banks includes  the following  22 institutions:
5 banks from Austria (Creditanstalt,  GZ Bank, Osterreichische  Volksbanken,  Postsparkasse,  and
Zentralsparkasse  und Commerzialbank); 4 banks from Italy (Banca  Commerciale  Italiana, Cariplo,
Istituto Mobiliare Italiano  through Generalinvest,  a Swiss subsidiary, and San Paolo di Torino);  3
banks from Germany (Bayerische  Vereinsbank,  DG Bank and Dresdner Bank); 3 banks from France
(Banque  Nationale  de Paris, Credit Lyonnais  and Societe  Generale); 2 banks from the United States
19(Citibank  and Heller International); 3 banks from Japan (the Long-term Credit Bank of Japan, Mitsui
Taiyo Kobe Bank and Nomura Securities); 1 bank from Israel (Bank Leumi); and 1 bank from
Korea (Daewoo  Securities). The Central Bank of Exchange  and Commerce  (or Central Wechsel-  und
Creditbank)  which appears as a partner in several  joint venture banks is an Austrian bank that is fully
owned by the NBH.
Although  the number  of foreign banks is clearly impressive,  their impact  on the Hungarian
banking  market is diluted by the limited shareholdings  of most of them in joint venture banks. Their
impact  would have been much  greater if foreign banks were allowed  to open branches  or at least
establish  fully-owned  subsidiaries.
Table Al provides data on total assets and staff for each bank for 1990.
The number of branches  for a few banks is also shown.
20Table  Al
HUNGARY:  ASSETS,  STAFF  AND  BRANCHES  OF  BANKS  AND  SFIs,  1990
Assets  Staff  Branches
HUF  mn  X
Large  commercial  banks
Hungarian  Credit  Bank  256.3  15.8  4400  85
Foreign  Trade  Bank  230.0  14.2  878  6
Commercial  &  Credit  Bank  191.5  11.8  3543  70
Budapest  Bank  103.4  6.4  1960  50
Subtotal  781.2  48.2  10781  211
Joint  venture  banks
Postabank  41.1  2.5  506  12
Inter-Europa  Bank  25.0  1.5  149
Unicbenk  21.6  1.3  78
Central-European  Credit  Bank  17.4  1.1  32
Citibank  15.4  1.0  82
Creditanstalt  15.3  0.9  26
General  Banking  & Trust  (AEB)  14.1  0.9  207
Leumi  Credit  Bank  2.0  0.1  30
Subtotal  151.9  9.4  1110
Other commercial banks
Agrobank  16.1  1.0  454
Nezobank  14.4  0.9  216
Konzumbank  8.7  0.5  119
General  Bank  for  Venture  Finance  AVB  8.2  0.5  94
Dunabank  6.7  0.4  120
Iparbank  4.2  0.3  64
Ybl  Bank  3.4  0.2  110
SubtotaL  61.7  3.8  1177
Savings  banks
National  Savings  Bank  558.3  34.4  14033  431
Bank  for  Savings  CooperatIves  (MTB)  24.7  1.5  171  11
Subtotal  583.0  36.0  14204
Specialized  finance  institutes  (SFIs)
Investrade  9.2  0.6  22
Industrial  Development  Bank  7.6  0.5  71  3
Ingatlan  (Real  Estate)  Bank  7.3  0.5  64
Merkantil  Bank  5.2  0.3  39
Realbank  4.8  0.3  30
Kulturbank  3.1  0.2  18
Investbank  2.6  0.2  33
Innofinance  2.1  0.1  28
Portfolio  Bank  1.0  0.1  7
Subtotal  42.9  2.6  312
Grand  Totel  1620.7  100.0  27584
20aANNEX 2
Spreads. Leverage  and Inflation
The measurement  of bank efficiency  is difficult  for any banking  system, mainly because  of the
absence  of a satisfactory  definition  of bank output.  Neither the number nor the value of loans and
deposits, which are extensively  used in econometric  studies of bank efficiency  and economies  of scale,
provide a good indication  of the value of services  offered by banks. The value added of banks, given
by total labor costs and profits, provides a better indication  of the size of the banking industry, but
since it is a measure of both the output and cost of banking, it could not be used for measuring  bank
efficiency. Faced with these difficulties, most analysts  resort to the use of accounting  data on bank
margins, costs and profits as measures  of efficiency. However, as discussed extensively  in Vittas
(1991), the usefulness  of such ratios, not only for international  comparisons  but also for comparing
banks in a given country, is undermined  by differences  in capital structure, business mix, inflation
rates, and accounting  conventions.
A useful approach  that takes account  of many of the above differences is the ROE (return on
equity) analysis. This is based on two identities  between  profitability  ratios, bank leverage and
product mix.  ROE analysis  can also be used to shed light on the relationship  between bank spreads,
leverage  and inflation. It should, however, be stressed  that ROE analysis  cannot overcome the
problems caused by differences in accounting  conventions,  especially  with regard to the valuation  of
assets, the level and treatment of loan provisioning  and the use of hidden  reserves.
The first identity  used in ROE analysis  states that the real ROE "r" is equal to leverage "g"
times the real ROA "a", or in algebraic  terms,
(1)  r  =  g  *  a
Similarly, the nominal ROE "n" is equal to leverage "g" times the nominal ROA "b"
(2)  n  =  g  *  b
With inflation  equal to "p", the nominal ROE is also equal to
(3)  n  =  {(l+r) * (I+p)}  - I
replacing (3) into (2) and solving for the nominal ROA gives
(4)  b  =  (l_r)  * (I+V)_ -1I
g
When inflation  is zero, "b" equals "a".  Equation (4) shows that the required nominal ROA,
representing  the average spread or margin on all assets after the deduction  of all costs, depends on the
targeted real ROE, the level of inflation  and the degree of leverage. A targeted real ROE of 10%
would require a nominal ROA of 0.50% with zero inflation  and leverage of 20, but the required
nominal ROA would rise to 0.78% with 5% inflation,  to 1.05% with 10% inflation  and 2.15% with
inflation  of 30%.  With a leverage  of 10 instead  of 20, the corresponding  required nominal ROAs
would be twice as high and with a leverage  of only 5, they would  be four times as high.
21The second identity  used in ROE analysis  stipulates  that the nominal ROA "b" is equal to the
product of the nominal gross income  margin "mn and the profit ratio "q".
(5)  b=  m  *  q
or
(6)  m  =Jb
q
and
(7)  m =  1__+1)_*  ____-
g  q
The profit ratio is equal to (1-c), where "c" is the cost/income  ratio based on total costs
including  all types of provisions. Thus, a high cost bank will have a low profit ratio and vice versa.
A bank with a profit ratio of 20% would need a gross income margin that is 5 times its nominal
kOA, but a bank with a 50% profit ratio would require a gross margin of only twice its ROA.  The
profit ratio reflects the product mix as well as the range and quality of services offered by a bank but
it also depends on its operating efficiency. Equation (7) shows that a combination  of high inflation,
low leverage  and high/cost  operations may require a very high gross income margin in order to
achieve a targeted real ROE of 10%.
22TABLE  Cl
OPERATING  ASSET  RATIOS
percent  of  average total  assets
Non-  Gross
Interest  Interest  Income  Operat.  Provis.  Total  Pre-tax  Taxes  Post-tax Margin  Income  Margin  Costs  Costs  ROA  ROA
HUNGARY  (1990)  HUNGARY  (1990) All  banks  4  3.8  7.8  3.8  0.7  4.5  3.3  Atl  banks Large coomrcial  banks  4.8  2.9  7.7  3.6  0.9  4.5  3.2  Large commercial banks Small & medium  banks  6.5  1.8  8.3  1.7  0.5  2.2  6.1  Smalt & medium  banks Savings banks  2.7  5.2  7.9  4.2  0.5  4.7  3.2  Savings banks
EGYPT  (1986-90)  EGYPT  (1986-90) Large public  sector  banks  1.66  1.38  3.04  1.10  1.23  2.33  0.71  0.34  0.37  Large public  sector  banks Large  joint  venture  banks  2.30  1.54  3.84  na  na  2.36  1.48  0.37  1.11  Large  joint  venture  banks Small  & medium  size  banks  2.60  1.46  4.06  1.75  1.18  2.93  1.13  0.20  0.93  Small  & medium  size  banks Foreign  banks  1.97  1.92  3.89  na  na  3.08  0.81  0.21  0.60  Foreign  banks
PORTUGAL  (1985-89)  PORTUGAL  (1985-89) Commercial  banks  3.26  0.75  4.01  2.25  1.17  3.42  0.59  0.08  0.51  Commercial  banks
GREECE  (1985-89)  GREECE  (1985-89) Large  commercial  banks  1.06  1.96  3.02  2.36  0.29  2.65  0.37  Large  comercial  banks
TURKEY  (1985-89)  TURKEY  (1985-89) Conmmercial  banks  4.48  1.99  6.47  3.12  1.11  4.23  2.24  Coawrcial  banks
MOROCCO  (1988-90)  MOROCCO  (1988-90) Large comiercial  banks  2.85  1.35  4.20  2.60  0.30  2.90  1.30  Large  commercial  banks
THAILAND  (1986-88)  THAILAND  (1986-88) Commercial  banks  2.32  0.81  3.13  2.07  0.50  2.57  0.56  0.27  0.29  Commercial  banksTABLE  C2
OPERATING  ASSET  RATIOS
percent  of  average total  assets
Non-  Gross
Interest  Interest  Income  Operat.  Provis.  Total  Pre-tax  Taxes  Post-tax Margin  Income  Margin  Costs  Costs  ROA  ROA
UNITED  STATES  (1985-89) 
UNITED  STATES  (1985-89) ALL Conmercial  Banks  3.39  1.52  4.91  3.28  0.84  4.12  0.79  0.23  0.56  ALl  Commercial  Banks Small  banks  4.05  0.84  4.89  3.35  0.65  4.00  0.89  0.18  0.71  SmaLL  banks Medfum  banks  3.73  1.33  5.06  3.46  0.67  4.13  0.93  0.20  0.73  Nedium  banks Money  centre  banks  2.46  2.12  4.58  3.11  1.12  4.23  0.35  0.19  0.16  Money  centre  banks Other  large  banks  3.27  1.57  4.84  3.20  0.93  4.13  0.71  0.15  0.56  Other  large  banks
GERMANY  (1985-89) 
GERMANY  (1985-89) All  commercial  banks  2.21  0.73  2.94  2.11  0.13  2.24  0.70  0.38  0.32  All  comuercial  banks Big  commerciat  banks  2.60  0.98  3.58  2.58  0.11  2.69  0.89  0.49  0.40  Big  commercial  banks Savings  banks  3.05  0.33  3.38  2.15  0.43  2.58  0.80  0.53  0.27  Savings  banks Credit  cooperatives  3.07  0.39  3.46  2.73  0.07  2.80  0.66  0.45  0.21  Credit  cooperatives Giro  landesbanks  0.78  0.10  0.88  0.48  0.17  0.65  0.23  0.15  0.08  Giro  landesbanks
UNITED  KINGDOM  (1985-89) 
UNITED  KINGDOM  (1985-89) Large  commercial  banks  3.21  1.71  4.92  3.27  0.81  4.08  0.84  0.34  0.50  Large  commercial  banks N)  Building  societies  2.04  0.36  2.40  1.15  0.00  1.15  1.25  0.45  0.80  Building  societies
SPAIN  (1986-89) 
SPAIN  (1986-89) Comnercial  banks  4.02  0.99  5.01  3.19  0.63  3.82  1.19  Commercial  banks Savings  banks  5.00  0.69  5.69  4.28  0.36  4.64  1.05  Savings  banks
CANADA  (1984-88) 
CANADA  (1984-88) Domestic  banks  2.78  0.97  3.75  2.20  0.65  2.85  0.91  0.30  0.60  Domestic  banks Foreign  banks  1.73  0.72  2.45  1.52  0.34  1.86  0.59  0.30  0.29  Foreign  banks
NETHERLANDS  (1985-89) 
NETHERLANDS  (1985-89) Commercial  banks  2.02  0.74  2.76  1.82  0.23  2.05  0.71  Commercial  banks Savings  banks  3.12  0.29  3.41  2.36  0.04  2.40  1.01  Savings  banks
ITALY  (1985-89) 
ITALY (1985-89) ALt  conmercial  banks  3.20  1.30  4.50  2.97  0.54  3.51  0.99  0.42  0.57  All  commerciaL  banks Large  commercial  banks  2.68  1.45  4.13  2.89  0.52  3.41  0.72  0.25  0.47  Large  commerciaL  banks Savings  banks  3.83  1.25  5.08  3.00  0.89  3.89  1.19  0.66  0.53  Savings  banks
AUSTRIA  (1985-89) 
AUSTRIA  (1985-89) Large  commercial  banks  1.34  0.24  1.58  1.20  1.20  0.38  0.06  0.32  Large  commercial  banks Savings  banks  2.05  0.21  2.26  1.74  1.74  0.52  0.11  0.41  Savings  banks
FRANCE  (1985-89) 
FRANCE  (1985-89) Comercfal  & mutuaL banks  2.40  0.48  2.88  1.92  0.57  2.49  0.39  0.13  0.26  Commercial  & mutuaL  banks Large commercial banks  2.29  0.56  2.85  1.88  0.65  2.53  0.32  0.11  0.20  Large  commerciaL  banksTABLE  C3
OPERATING  INCONE  RATIOS
percent  of  gross  income
Non-  Pre-tax  Post-tax
Interest  Interest  Gross  Operat.  Provis.  Total  Profit  Taxes  Profit
Margin  Income  Income  Costs  Costs  Ratio  Ratio
HUNGARY  (1990)  HUNGARY  (1990) Att  banks  51.3  48.7  100.0  48.7  9.0  57.7  42.3  0.0  0.0  All  banks Large commercial banks  62.3  37.7  100.0  46.8  11.7  58.4  41.6  0.0  0.0  Large comercial  banks Small & medium  banks  78.3  21.7  100.0  20.5  6.0  26.5  73.5  0.0  0.0  Smalt & medium  banks Savings banks  34.2  65.8  100.0  53.2  6.3  59.5  40.5  0.0  0.0  Savings banks
EGYPT  (1986-90)  EGYPT  (1986-90O Large public  sector  banks  54.6  45.4  100.0  36.2  40.5  76.6  23.4  11.2  12.2  Large  public  sector  banks Large joint  venture banks  59.9  40.1  100.0  na  na  61.5  38.5  9.6  28.9  Large joint  venture banks Small & medium  size  banks  64.0  36.0  100.0  43.1  29.1  72.2  27.8  4.9  22.9  Smalt & medium  size  banks Foreign banks  50.6  49.4  100.0  na  na  79.2  20.8  5.4  15.4  Foreign banks
PORTUGAL  (1985-89)  PORTUGAL  (1985-89) Commercial  banks  81.3  18.7  100.0  56.1  29.2  85.3  14.7  2.0  12.7  Comercial  banks
GREECE  (1985-89)  GREECE  (1985-L") Large  commercial  banks  35.1  64.9  100.0  78.1  9.6  87.7  12.3  Large  commercial  banks
TURKEY  (1985-89)  TURKEY  (1985-89) Commercial  banks  69.2  30.8  100.0  48.2  17.2  65.4  34.6  ComcerciaL  banks
MOROCCO  (1988-90)  MOROCCO  (1988-90) Large  commercial  banks  67.9  32.1  100.0  61.9  7.1  69.0  31.0  Large  commercial  banks
THAILAND  (1986-88)  THAILAND  (1986-88) Commercial  banks  74.1  25.9  100.0  66.1  16.0  82.1  17.9  8.6  9.3  Commercial  banksTABLE  C4
OPERATING  INCOE RATIOS
percent  of  gross income
Non-  Pre-tax  Post-tax Interest  Interest  Gross  Operat.  Provis.  Total  Profit  Taxes  Profit Margin  Income  Income  Costs  Costs  Ratio  Ratio
UNITED  STATES  (1985-89) 
UNITED  STATES  (1985-89) All  Commercial  Banks  69.0  31.0  100.0  66.8  17.1  83.9  16.1  4.7  11.4  Alt  Comnercial Banks Small  banks  82.8  17.2  100.0  68.5  13.3  81.8  18.2  3.7  14.5  Small banks Medium  banks  73.7  26.3  100.0  68.4  13.2  81.6  18.4  4.0  14.4  Medium  banks Money  centre  banks  53.7  46.3  100.0  67.9  24.5  92.4  7.6  4.1  3.5  money  centre  banks Other  large  banks  67.6  32.4  100.0  66.1  19.2  85.3  14.7  3.1  11.6  Other  large banks GERMANY  (1985-89) 
GERMANY  (1985-89) All  commercial banks  75.2  24.8  100.0  71.8  4.4  76.2  23.8  12.9  10.9  All  commercial banks Big commercial banks  72.6  27.4  100.0  72.1  3.1  75.1  24.9  13.7  11.2  Big comercial  banks Savings banks  90.2  9.S  100.0  63.6  12.7  76.3  23.7  15.7  8.0  Savings banks Credit  cooperatives  88.7  11.3  100.0  78.9  2.0  80.9  19.1  13.0  6.1  Credit  cooperatives Giro  landesbanks  88.6  11.4  100.0  54.5  19.3  73.9  26.1  17.0  9.1  Giro  landesbanks
UNITED  KINGDOM  (1985-89) 
UNITED  KINGDOM  (1985-89) Cy\  Large commercial banks  65.2  34.8  100.0  66.5  16.5  82.9  17.1  6.9  10.2  Large commerciat  banks Building  societies  85.0  15.0  100.0  47.9  0.0  47.9  52.1  18.8  33.3  Building  societies SPAIN  (1986-89) 
SPAIN  (1986-89) Conmercial banks  80.2  19.8  100.0  63.7  12.6  76.2  23.8  Commercial  banks Savings banks  87.9  12.1  100.0  75.2  6.3  81.5  18.5  Savings banks
CANADA  (1984-88)
Domestic banks  74.1  25.9  100.0  58.7  17.3  76.0  24.3  8.0  16.0  Domestic  banks Foreign banks  70.6  29.4  100.0  62.0  13.9  75.9  24.1  12.2  11.8  Foreign banks
NETHERLANDS  (1985-89) 
NETHERLANDS  (1985-89) Comercial  banks  73.2  26.8  100.0  65.9  8.3  74.3  25.7  Commercial  banks Savings banks  91.5  8.5  100.0  69.2  1.2  70.4  29.6  Savings banks
ITALY (1985-89) 
ITALY (1985-89) All  cwmercial  banks  71.1  28.9  100.0  66.0  12.0  78.0  22.0  9.3  12.7  All  commercial banks Large comercial  banks  64.9  35.1  100.0  70.0  12.6  82.6  17.4  6.1  11.4  Large commercial banks Savings banks  75.4  24.6  100.0  59.1  17.5  76.6  23.4  13.0  10.4  Savings banks AUSTRIA  (1985-89) 
AUSTRIA  (1985-89) Large commercial banks  84.8  15.2  100.0  75.9  75.9  24.1  3.8  20.3  Large commercial banks Savings banks  90.7  9.3  100.0  77.0  77.0  23.0  4.9  18.1  Savings banks FRANCE  (1985-89) 
FRANCE  (1985-89) Commercial  & mutual banks  83.3  16.7  100.0  66.7  19.8  86.5  13.5  4.5  9.0  Commercial  & mutual banks Large .omuiercial banks  80.4  19.6  100.0  66.0  22.8  88.8  11.2  3.9  7.0  Large commercial banksTABLE  C5
OPERATING  EQUITY  RATIOS
percent  of  gross  income
Non- 
Memo
Interest  Interest  Gross  Operat.  Provis. Total  Pre-tax Taxes  Post-tax  Equity Margin  income  income  Costs  Costs  ROE  ROE  Ratio
HUNGARY  (1990) 
HUNGARY  (1990) All  banks  84.0  79.8  163.9  79.8  14.7  94.5  69.3  0.0  0.0  4.76  All  banks Large  commercial  banks  101.1  61.1  162.1  75.8  18.9  94.7  67.4  0.0  0.0  4.75  Large  commercial  banks Small  & medium banks  36.4  10.1  46.5  9.5  2.8  12.3  34.2  0.0  0.0  17.85  Small  & mediun  banks Savings  banks  69.6  134.0  203.6  108.2  12.9  121.1  82.5  0.0  0.0  3.88  Savings  banks
EGYPT  (1986-90) 
EGYPT  (1986-90) Large  public  sector  banks  87.8  73.0  160.8  58.2  65.1  123.3  37.6  18.0  19.6  1.89  Large  public  sector  banks Large  joint  venture  banks  38.0  25.4  63.4  na  na  38.9  24.4  6.1  18.3  6.06  Large  joint  venture  banks Small  &  mediun  size  banks  37.7  21.2  58.8  25.4  17.1  42.5  16.4  2.9  13.5  6.90  Small  &  mediun  size  banks Foreign  banks  32.3  31.5  63.9  na  na  50.6  13.3  3.4  9.9  6.09  Foreign  banks
PORTUGAL  (1985-89) 
PORTUGAL  (1985-89) Commercial  banks  40.3  9.3  49.6  27.8  14.5  42.3  7.3  1.0  6.3  8.09  Commercial  banks
GREECE  (1985-89) 
GREECE  (1985-89) Large  commercial  banks  42.1  77.8  119.8  93.7  11.5  105.2  14.7  2.52  Large  commercial  banks
TURKEY  (1985-89) 
TURKEY  (1985-89) Commercial  banks  109.8  48.8  158.6  76.5  27.2  103.7  54.9  4.08  Commercial  banks
MOROCCO  (1988-90) 
MOROCCO  (1988-90) Large  commercial  banks  47.7  22.6  70.4  43.6  5.0  48.6  21.8  5.97  Large  commercial  banks
THAILAND  (1986-88) 
THAILAND  (1986-88) Counmercial banks  44.6  15.6  60.2  39.8  9.6  49.4  10.8  5.2  5.6  5.20  Commercial  banksTABLE  C6
OPERATING  EQUITY  RATIOS
percent  of  average  equity
Non-  Memo
Interest  Interest  Gross  Operat.  Provis.  TotaL  Pre-tax  Taxes  Post-tax  Equity Margin  Income  Income  Costs  Costs  ROE  ROE  Ratio
UNITED  STATES  (1985-89) 
UNITED  STATES  (1985-89) ALL Commercial  Banks  55.0  24.7  79.7  53.2  13.6  66.9  12.8  3.7  9.1  6.16  All Commercial  Banks Small  banks  49.6  10.3  59.9  41.1  8.0  49.0  10.9  2.2  8.7  8.16  Small  banks Nediun  banks  56.9  20.3  77.3  52.8  10.2  63.1  14.2  3.1  11.1  6.55  Mediun  banks Money  centre  banks  53.7  46.3  100.0  67.9  24.5  92.4  7.6  4.1  3.5  4.58  Money  centre  banks Other  large  banks  60.4  29.0  89.5  59.1  17.2  76.3  13.1  2.8  10.4  5.41  Other  large  banks
GERhANY  (1985-89) 
GERMANY  (1985-89) All  commercial  banks  47.5  15.7  63.2  45.4  2.8  48.2  15.1  8.2  6.9  4.65  ALL  commercial  banks Big commercial  banks  55.6  20.9  76.5  55.1  2.4  57.5  19.0  10.5  8.5  4.68  Big  commercial  banks Savings  banks  81.3  8.8  90.1  57.3  11.5  68.8  21.3  14.1  7.2  3.75  Savings  banks Credit  cooperatives  79.7  10.1  89.9  70.9  1.8  72.7  17.1  11.7  5.5  3.85  Credit  cooperatives Giro landesbanks  33.9  4.3  38.3  20.9  7.4  28.3  10.0  6.5  3.5  2.30  Giro  landesbanks
D  UUNITED 
KINGDOM  (1985-89) Large  commercial  banks  63.8  34.0  97.8  65.0  16.1  81.1  16.7  6.8  9.9  5.03  Large  commerciaL  banks Building  societies  47.6  8.4  55.9  26.8  0.0  26.8  29.1  10.5  18.6  4.29  Building  societies
SPAIN  (1986-89) 
SPAIN  (1986-89) Commercial  banks  61.4  15.1  76.5  48.7  9.6  58.3  18.2  6.55  Commercial  banks Savings  banks  83.3  11.5  94.8  71.3  6.0  77.3  17.5  6.00  Savings  banks
CANADA  (1984-88) 
CANADA  (1984-88) Domestic  banks  57.6  20.1  77.6  45.5  13.5  59.0  18.8  6.2  12.4  4.83  Domestic  banks Foreign  banks  23.1  9.6  32.8  20.3  4.5  24.9  7.9  4.0  3.9  7.48  Foreign  banks
NETHERLANDS  (1985-89) 
NETHERLANDS  (1985-89) Commercial  banks  50.5  18.5  69.0  45.5  5.8  51.3  17.8  4.00  Commercial  banks Savings  banks  37.9  3.5  41.4  28.6  0.5  29.1  12.3  8.24  Savings  banks
ITALY  (1985-89) 
ITALY  (1985-89) All commercial  banks  49.8  20.2  70.0  46.2  8.4  54.6  15.4  6.5  8.9  6.43  All  commercial  banks Larse  commeicial  banks  50.2  27.2  77.3  54.1  9.7  63.9  13.5  4.7  8.8  5.34  Large  commercial  banks Savings  banks  59.4  19.4  78.8  46.5  13.8  60.3  18.4  10.2  8.2  6.45  Savings  banks
AUSTRIA  (1985-89) 
AUSTRIA  (1985-89) Large  commercial  banks  41.1  7.4  48.5  36.8  36.P  11.7  1.8  9.8  3.26  Large  commercial  banks Savings  banks  55.3  5.7  60.9  46.9  46.9  14.0  3.0  11.1  3.71  Savings  banks
FRANCE  (1985-89) 
FRANCE  (1985-89) Commercial  & mutual  banks  90.6  18.1  108.7  72.5  21.5  94.0  14.7  4.9  9.8  2.65  Commercial  & mutual  banks Large  commercial  banks  110.6  27.1  137.7  90.8  31.4  122.2  15.5  5.3  9.7  2.07  Large  commercial  banksBibiography
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